「ほっ」と。キャンペーン

風知草:50年来の無責任=山田孝男

(Mainichi Japan) July 4, 2011
Lack of responsibility between state, TEPCO for nuclear disaster has deep roots
風知草:50年来の無責任=山田孝男

Is compensation over ongoing nuclear disaster the responsibility of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) which operates the stricken nuclear power plant, or the national government?
 原発震災の賠償は東京電力の責任か、政府の責任か。

According to a new nuclear disaster compensation bill that has been submitted by the Cabinet and is slated for deliberations in the Diet this week, the answer is this: "TEPCO, of course, but the government will provide TEPCO with some assistance."
「東電に決まっているが、政府としても東電のお手伝いはします」というのが、今週から国会で審議が始まる原子力損害賠償支援機構法案である。

The outlook for the bill's passage remains uncertain.
成立の見通しは立っていない。

The lacking presence of this bill and the challenges that lie ahead of it are symbolic of Japan's uneasiness stuck between the promotion of nuclear power and its elimination.
 この法案の頼りない存在感と前途多難は、原発推進と脱原発の波間をただよう日本の不安を象徴している。

If nuclear power is to be given another chance, it is obvious that the only viable way would be for the national government to take over its promotion.
 原発推進か、脱原発か。推進なら、もはや国営しか引き合わないことが明白だが、

The government, however, has yet to clarify its stand.
国の方針がはっきりしない。

The proposed bill ambiguously states that the government will "aid" the power company.
法案は、国が電力会社を「援助」するという微妙な言い回しだ。

It's an equivocal stopgap measure that neither pardons nor kills off TEPCO, and can be interpreted as the willingness or lack thereof on the part of the government to actually shell out any money.
東電を生かさず殺さず、国がカネを出すとも出さぬとも読める、急場しのぎの玉虫色。

This sums up the essence of the nuclear disaster compensation bill.
それが支援機構法案の特徴だ。

There was a tussle within the Cabinet prior to the creation of the bill, between 72-year-old Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Kaoru Yosano and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, 47.
 法案の作成に先立って閣僚間にバトルがあった。与謝野馨経済財政担当相(72)と枝野幸男官房長官(47)である。

Article 3 of the existing law on nuclear damage compensation states: "When nuclear damage has occurred owing to or during the operation of a reactor, etc., the nuclear operator who is engaged in the operation of the reactor, etc. on that occasion shall be liable for the damage."
 既にある原子力損害賠償法の3条は、電力会社に事故の賠償責任を負わせる一方、

However, it goes on to make an exception "for the case where the damage is caused by an extraordinarily grave natural disaster or by a serious social disturbance.
「異常に巨大な天災地変」は例外として免責と定めている。

Yosano argued that the latest case constituted "obvious exemption (from liability)," to which Edano objected: "Unless we make law revisions, we cannot reach that conclusion about the situation."
 「今回は当然、免責だ」と与謝野が言い、枝野が「法改正しない限り、そういう解釈は無理です」と反対した。

Yosano is a favored disciple of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, a pioneering figure in Japan's nuclear power policy.
 与謝野は日本の原子力政策のパイオニア・中曽根康弘元首相の愛弟子だ。

After graduating from college, Yosano joined the newly established Japan Atomic Power Co. on Nakasone's recommendation, where he dealt with insurance.
大学卒業後、中曽根の勧めで創立間もない「日本原子力発電」に入り、保険を担当した。

Edano, meanwhile, is a lawyer. This makes the dispute one between two experts.
枝野は弁護士。玄人同士のケンカである。

In the end, Edano won out.
 結局、枝野が押し切った。

This meant that TEPCO, which faces a massive excess of debts, will not be able to newly procure funds, threatening the stable supply of electricity.
そうなると、債務超過必至の東電は新たな資金調達ができず、電力の安定供給が揺らぐ。

This was what led the Cabinet to concoct the new nuclear disaster compensation bill.
そこで支援機構法案をひねり出したという流れだ。

Asked why Yosano buried the hatchet, he responded:
 矛を収めた理由を与謝野に聞くと、こう答えた。

"I was told by the Finance Ministry that the national government does not compensate disaster victims, and if TEPCO were to be exempted from paying restitution, then there would be no one to act as the agent of compensation."
 「国は被災者の補償はしないから、東電を免責すると賠償の主体がなくなっちゃう。財務省にそう言われてね」

The conflict has deep roots.
 バトルの根は深い。

I found through some research that the Kishi Cabinet, in stepping up its efforts toward the peaceful use of nuclear power, established a team of experts in 1958 led by renowned civil-law scholar Sakae Wagatsuma, to advise the government on the issue of compensation in the case of a nuclear disaster.
調べてみると、次のような経緯が分かった。1958年、原子力の平和利用へアクセルを踏んだ岸内閣は、高名な民法学者・我妻栄をトップとする専門家チームを設け、原子力災害の損害賠償について助言を求めた。

The team, which looked into how the issue of compensation was being handled in industrialized nations, submitted a report stating that state compensation payments were necessary in worst-case scenarios.
 先進国事情を調べた専門家チームは「万一の場合は国家補償が必要」と答申したが、

However, in the process of deliberating and passing the current law on nuclear damage compensation, which took the experts' recommendations into account and went into effect in 1961, state compensation was effectively eliminated.
それを踏まえた原子力損害賠償法(61年施行)の立法過程で国家補償は骨抜きにされた。

A section chief at the then Ministry of International Trade and Industry who worked on the bill revealed in a roundtable discussion that the watering down of state liability had been the wish of the Ministry of Finance at the time.
 それは大蔵省(現財務省)の意向だったと、法案作成にかかわった通商産業省(現経済産業省)の課長が、法律雑誌「ジュリスト」(61年10月15日号)の座談会で暴露している。

In the discussion, featured in the Oct. 15, 1961 issue of legal journal Jurist, the section chief said that the Finance Ministry had brushed off possible stipulation of state redress, declaring that "the state had never assumed direct responsibility for victims since the Meiji era."
「明治以来、被害者の直接賠償責任を国が負ったことはない」と財政当局が押し切った。

Wagatsuma, who moderated the roundtable discussion, expressed regret upon hearing what had happened behind the law-making scenes.
 座談会の中で、裏話を知った司会の我妻が嘆いている。

"To say that because the operator has no responsibility, neither does the state, and to deal with nuclear disasters in the same way as natural disasters like the (1959) Isewan Typhoon (Typhoon Vera) ... this is such a shame. If things were going to turn out this way, I feel we should have given things more thought."
「事業者も責任がないから国家にも責任がない、そして災害救助でやる、伊勢湾台風と同じに取り扱うという。非常に残念で、こうなるのだったら、もっと考えておくべきだったという気持ちもするのです……」

As it turns out, the irresponsibility of the government and TEPCO in the latest nuclear disaster has its roots in events that transpired half a century ago.
 原発震災をめぐる政府・東電の無責任体制のルーツは50年前にあった。

Nuclear power plants were still in their planning stages at the time, but today we live in a nuclear-dependent society.
当時は原発の構想段階だったが、いまや原発依存社会だ。

And still, the avoidance of responsibility continues, and it is by extension that the latest nuclear disaster compensation bill has emerged.
それなのに無責任体制は続き、その延長線上に支援機構法案の漂流がある。

The three criteria that Prime Minister Naoto Kan has listed as conditions for his resignation are the passage of the second supplementary budget for fiscal 2011, a special government bond bill and a renewable energy bill.
 首相の「辞任3条件」は補正予算、特例公債法案、再生可能エネルギー法案の成立だ。

The new nuclear disaster compensation bill didn't make the cut.
支援機構法案は入ってない。

This points to Kan's glaring lack of awareness regarding the significance of the problem.
問題意識が感じられない。

I question his sensibilities.
首相の感覚を私は疑う。

(By Takao Yamada, Expert Senior Writer)
(敬称略)(毎週月曜日掲載)

毎日新聞 2011年7月4日 東京朝刊
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by kiyoshimat | 2011-07-06 03:24 | 英字新聞

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